- 2 months ago
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00:00:00I was assigned a listing post at Con Tien in the fall.
00:00:25That was like getting a death sentence at a trial.
00:00:27Because that's just three marines out there with a radio.
00:00:32And that's the scariest thing I did.
00:00:34You're listening for the enemy.
00:00:37They call you on the radio every hour.
00:00:40Delta Lima, Papa 3, Bravo.
00:00:42Delta Lima, Papa 3, Bravo.
00:00:43Delta 3.
00:00:45If your set rep is Alpha Sierra, key your handset twice.
00:00:49If your situation report is all secure, break squelch twice on the handset.
00:00:55And if it's not, they keep thinking you're asleep.
00:00:57So they keep asking you, if your set rep is Alpha Sierra, and then it finally dawns on them,
00:01:01maybe there's somebody too close for you to say anything.
00:01:04So then they say, if your set rep is negative, Alpha Sierra, key your handset once,
00:01:08and you down here squeeze the handle off the, you know, and two on the radio,
00:01:11because they're so close that you can hear them whispering to one another.
00:01:15And that's scary stuff.
00:01:19That's real scary stuff.
00:01:20And I'm scared of the dark still.
00:01:24I still got a nightlight.
00:01:26When my kids were growing up,
00:01:29that's the first time they really found out that Daddy had been in a war,
00:01:35when they said, well, why do we need to outgrow our nightlights?
00:01:39Daddy's still got one.
00:01:40Let the word go forth from this time and place to friend and foe alike
00:01:53that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans
00:01:59born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace.
00:02:08I still believed very much in this concept of an heroic America.
00:02:17America being a really special country,
00:02:20the best country in the world, the best democracy,
00:02:23all the things that we believe about it,
00:02:26which, and I didn't really see anything wrong with that.
00:02:32I was sure that we were right to be in Vietnam,
00:02:35you know, because it started under Kennedy,
00:02:39and to me, JFK was God.
00:02:42Anything that he thought was right, I thought was right.
00:02:47At 43, John Fitzgerald Kennedy
00:02:50was the youngest man ever elected president of the United States.
00:02:54He had promised bold new leadership,
00:02:58and to his supporters, his inauguration seemed to signal a new day.
00:03:02To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free,
00:03:09we pledge our word
00:03:11that one form of colonial control
00:03:15shall not have passed away
00:03:17merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny.
00:03:22We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view,
00:03:28but we shall always hope to find them
00:03:31strongly supporting their own freedom.
00:03:35And to remember that in the past,
00:03:39those who foolishly sought power
00:03:41by riding the back of the tiger
00:03:44ended up inside.
00:03:46The new president gathered around him
00:03:57an extraordinary set of advisers
00:03:59who shared his determination to confront communism,
00:04:03including Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
00:04:07National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy,
00:04:10his deputy, Walt Rostow,
00:04:13Special Military Advisor General Maxwell Taylor,
00:04:17and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,
00:04:21who had given up his post
00:04:23as president of the Ford Motor Company
00:04:25to serve his country.
00:04:27He was a pioneer in the field of systems analysis.
00:04:31Like the president who picked them,
00:04:35all of Kennedy's men had served during World War II.
00:04:40Each had absorbed what they all believed
00:04:42was its central lesson.
00:04:44Ambitious dictatorships needed to be halted in their tracks
00:04:48before they constituted a serious danger
00:04:51to the peace of the world.
00:04:54Meanwhile, in South Vietnam,
00:04:57the National Liberation Front,
00:04:59labeled by its enemies the Viet Cong,
00:05:02was determined to overthrow the anti-communist
00:05:05and increasingly autocratic government
00:05:08of Ngo Dinh Dinh.
00:05:11In North Vietnam,
00:05:13unbeknownst to Washington,
00:05:15Ho Chi Minh,
00:05:16the father of Vietnamese independence,
00:05:19was now sharing power
00:05:20with a more aggressive leader,
00:05:22Le Xuan,
00:05:23who was even more impatient
00:05:25to reunify his country.
00:05:29None of us knew anything about Vietnam.
00:05:50Vietnam in those days was a piece on a chessboard a strategic chessboard not a
00:05:58place with a culture and a history that we would have an impossible time
00:06:06changing even with the mighty force of the United States over the next three
00:06:13years the United States would struggle to understand the complicated country it
00:06:18had come to save fail to appreciate the enemies resolve and misread how the South
00:06:24Vietnamese people really felt about their government the new president would find
00:06:32himself caught between the momentum of war and the desire for peace between
00:06:37humility and hubris between idealism and expediency between the truth and the lie
00:06:46and so my fellow Americans ask not what your country can do for you ask what you
00:07:16can do for your country I grew up in Missouri near Kansas City a little
00:07:29community called Fairmount I was born in 1948 and there were lots of kids being
00:07:35born in those days from the guys who were lucky enough to come home from World War
00:07:38War two my dad was a pilot in the Army Air Corps and all of dad's friends were
00:07:46World War two vets or Korean vets and all of my male teachers were veterans and even
00:07:52my pastor had been a chaplain well they were my heroes and I wanted to be like them
00:08:00for all of John Kennedy's soaring rhetoric for all the talent he gathered around him the first months of
00:08:14his presidency did not go well he approved the CIA sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs that ended in disaster
00:08:23he felt he'd been bullied by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at a summit meeting in Vienna he was unable to keep the Soviets from building the Berlin Wall
00:08:35and in Southeast Asia he refused to intervene against a communist insurrection in Laos
00:08:44critics accused him of being immature indecisive inadequate to the task of combating what seemed to be a mounting communist threat there are just so many concessions that we can make in one year and survive politically he confided to an aide in the spring of 1961
00:09:02in South Vietnam Kennedy felt he had to act after the president received reports that the Viet Cong might be in control of more than half the densely populated Mekong Delta he dispatched General Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow to Vietnam they urged him to commit American ground troops Kennedy refused
00:09:29it would be like taking a first drink he said the effect would soon wear off and there would be demands for another and another and another and another instead in the midst of a cold war with its constant risk of nuclear confrontation the president supported a new flexible way to confront and contain communism
00:09:59this is another type of warfare this is another type of warfare new in its intensity ancient in its origin war by guerrillas subversions insurgents assassins war by ambush instead of by combat by infiltration instead of aggression
00:10:18to fight to fight his limited wars Kennedy hoped to use the elite green berets
00:10:25special forces trained in guerrilla warfare counter insurgency
00:10:30they were meant to be dispatched to hot spots around the world
00:10:35Khrushchev said we're not going to destroy you with nuclear weapons we're going to destroy you with wars of national liberation
00:10:42everybody talked about the fact that that communism was spreading and it had to be stopped you went to command the general staff college and you were playing on maps with nuclear weapons and so forth and I escaped from that by getting into special forces so that instead of planning what we were going to do if world war three broke out we were actually doing stuff
00:11:11and Vietnam and Vietnam was a place where we were going to draw the line
00:11:18Kennedy sent the green berets to the central highlands of Vietnam to organize mountain tribes to fight the Viet Cong
00:11:26and to undertake covert missions to sabotage their supply bases in Laos and Cambodia
00:11:34but Kennedy understood that counter insurgency alone would never be enough so he doubled funding for South Vietnam's army dispatched helicopters and APCs armored personnel carriers
00:11:49Kennedy also authorized the use of napalm and the spraying of defoliance to deny cover to the Viet Cong and destroy the crops that fed them
00:12:03the whole array of chemicals was used including one named for the color of the stripes on the 55 gallon drums in which it came agent orange and the president quietly continued to increase the number of American military advisers within two years the number he had inherited would grow to eleven thousand three hundred
00:12:30people
00:12:32empowered not only to teach the army of the Republic of Vietnam the Arvin to fight a conventional war
00:12:37but to accompany them into battle a violation of the agreement that had divided Vietnam back in 1954
00:12:45the administration did its best to hide from the American people the scale of the build-up that was taking place on the other side of the world fearful that the public would not support the more active role advisers had begun to play in combat
00:13:04the American national committee publication has said that you are have been less than candid with the American people as to how deeply we are involved in Vietnam could you throw any more light on that we have increased our assistance to the government its logistics we have not sent combat troops there though the training missions that we have there have been instructed if they are fired upon to
00:13:11they are would of course fire back to protect themselves but we have not sent combat troops in the generally understood
00:13:18sense of the word so that I feel that we are being as frank as the
00:13:25as we can to the
00:13:26we have not sent combat troops there though the training missions that we have there uh have been
00:13:32instructed if they are fired upon to uh they are would of course fire back to protect themselves
00:13:37but we have not sent combat troops in the generally understood sense of the word so that i i feel that
00:13:44we are being as frank as the uh as we can be i think we what i have said to you is a
00:13:51description of our activity there
00:13:59i was a child of the cold war when i got off the plane in saigon humid evening in april 1962
00:14:08i really believed in all the ideology of the cold war on that if we lost south vietnam the rest of
00:14:15southeast asia would would fall to the communists there was an international communist conspiracy
00:14:21we believe fervently in this stuff neil sheehan was a 25 year old reporter for united press international
00:14:30upi he had served three years in the army in korea and japan before deciding to become a
00:14:37newspaperman vietnam was his first full-time overseas assignment and his only worry he remembered was that
00:14:45he would get there too late and miss out on the big story sheehan and other reporters rode along as the
00:14:52arvin mounted a series of helicopter assaults on enemy strongholds in the mekong delta and elsewhere
00:15:00and brought terror to the vietcong american pilots were after controls it was a crusade and it was thrilling
00:15:11and you'd climb aboard the helicopters with the vietnamese soldiers who were being taken out to battle
00:15:17and they'd take off and they'd contour fly they'd skim across the rice paddies and about three or four
00:15:22feet above the paddies and then pop up over the tree lines flying the field it was thrilling i mean
00:15:28it was absolutely thrilling and you believed in what was happening i mean you had the sense that we're
00:15:34fighting here and someday we'll win and this country will be a better country for our coming
00:15:41the new m113 armored personnel carriers were capable of churning across rivers and rice paddies and
00:15:49right through the earthen dikes that separated one field from the next the vietcong had nothing with
00:15:57which to stop them we were just overwhelming them with force with firepower and the firefights would
00:16:07be over in a pretty short time some people running lonely nights actually the uh canal is perpendicular to
00:16:14the one you're attacking now they have on black uniforms now estimate approximately three zero do
00:16:20you have inside over that's what was causing us to win see we were winning one after the other and
00:16:29we were not meeting a heck of a lot of resistance captain james scanlon had been stationed in west
00:16:35germany and had seen for himself the brutality with which the communist east germans dealt with anyone who
00:16:42dared try to escape to the west he was now in the mekong delta an advisor to the seventh division of the
00:16:50arvin and had begun to see evidence of vietcong brutality as well
00:16:58those of us who talked to the people who fled east germany we saw the need to stop the growth of
00:17:05communism to stop the dominoes from being tumbled that was a worthy cause as the arvin and their advisors
00:17:16pursued the vietcong the government of no ding xiem had launched an ambitious program meant to gain
00:17:23control of the countryside by concentrating the rural population into thousands of fortified settlements
00:17:30ringed with barbed wire and moats and bamboo spikes meant to keep out the vietcong they were called
00:17:39strategic hamlets part of the effort to win the hearts and minds and loyalty of the vietnamese people
00:17:48the french had tried something like it a decade before they had called it pacification
00:17:54president cm's strategic hamlet program is making substantial progress about 1600 of the some 14 000
00:18:04hamlets have been fortified to date by the summer of 1962 news from south vietnam seemed so promising
00:18:15that defense secretary robert mcnamara made sure the pentagon was prepared to implement a plan for a gradual
00:18:23withdrawal of american advisors to be completed by 1965. so far as most americans knew the united
00:18:32states was achieving its goal a stable independent anti-communist state in south vietnam
00:18:41it was a struggle this country cannot shirk the new york times said and the united states seemed to be
00:18:49winning it but that same summer ho chi min traveled to beijing in search of more help from the chinese
00:19:00the american build-up in south vietnam had alarmed him and the other leaders in hanoi ho told the chinese
00:19:08that american attacks on north vietnam itself now seemed only a matter of time the chinese promised to equip
00:19:17and arm tens of thousands of vietnamese soldiers meanwhile the politburo in hanoi had directed
00:19:26that every able-bodied north vietnamese man be required to serve in the armed forces
00:19:41inspired by their president's call thousands of young americans would join the peace corps
00:19:47and other organizations to help project american ideals and goodwill around the world
00:20:05we were not only there in vietnam to stop communism but there had to be something positive
00:20:12we're trying to find out what the vietnamese people want and help them get it and that was very
00:20:20simple but if you think about it also very complex but it went to the heart i thought of what we were
00:20:26trying to do pete hunting a 22 year old from oklahoma city would go to vietnam right after college to do
00:20:36what he could to help poor villagers in the countryside i was a soldier in the fight and i fought till we won
00:20:45my uniforms my dirty overhaul dear marco i finally finished up my work in fan rang last week
00:20:54and spent a month working on a windmill i'd promised the people of one handler
00:20:57and spent a lot of money too which i paid out of my own pocket well i'll give you my sweat i'll give
00:21:05you my blood i'm in soaring spirits today despite all the natural disasters political intrigues and
00:21:12subversive activities pete hunting worked for the international voluntary services a non-profit
00:21:21organization committed to improving agriculture education and public health he was one of hundreds
00:21:28of dedicated aid workers in south vietnam latest news on this side of the world is that i'll almost
00:21:39definitely be extending over here for another two years providing the country stays in one piece that long
00:21:44two years after he arrived pete hunting was driving in the mekong delta when he ran into a vietcong ambush
00:21:57he was shot five times in the head the first american civilian volunteer to be killed in vietnam
00:22:14in vietnam about winning the hearts and minds and you hear that expression but that should not
00:22:40be a joke it's a serious serious problem if you pull off a military operation and it may be successful
00:22:49on the military basis but you destroy a village and then you've created a village of resistance
00:22:58few advisors understood the unique challenges of fighting an insurgency in vietnam
00:23:03vietnam better than lieutenant colonel john paul van a career soldier from virginia he was the senior american
00:23:12advisor to the 7th arvin division in the mekong delta small wiry and abrasive john paul van was convinced
00:23:22he knew how to defeat the vietnam john paul van was simply the most remarkable soldier i ever met period
00:23:34the biggest challenge of john paul van's life was somehow saving vietnam winning that to him was the
00:23:46ultimate challenge when it became clear to van that the tactics the americans had taught the arvin
00:23:54were beginning to make more enemies than friends he sought out newspaper men to spread the word
00:24:02he was able to explain to us what was going on the important thing was not to alienate the population
00:24:09that if you got sniper fire from hamlet you sent in riflemen to take out the sniper
00:24:15he didn't shell the place because you were going to kill women and kids
00:24:18and destroy houses and you were going to turn the population against you
00:24:24most press coverage of vietnam was upbeat in the tradition of previous wars
00:24:31but a handful of young reporters including neil sheehan david halberstam of the new york times
00:24:38and malcolm brown of the associated press who spent time in the field with officers like van
00:24:45were beginning to see that from the vietnamese countryside things looked very different
00:24:50than they did from the press offices in washington or saigon so it was terribly important that we not
00:24:58only win the war but that we as reporters report the truth that would help to win the war
00:25:05we were very fervent in wanting to report the truth because it was very important
00:25:10to the welfare of our country and to the welfare of the world
00:25:15sheehan and his colleagues began asking tough questions about what constituted progress what
00:25:22victory would look like and if the people in the countryside where 80 percent of south vietnam's
00:25:28population lived could ever trust the government in saigon
00:25:35i remember going during one of robert mcnamara's visits out to one of these hamlets the vietnamese
00:25:40general who commanded the area was telling mcnamara what a wonderful thing this was
00:25:44and they did some of these farmers were down digging a ditch around around the hamlet and i looked at
00:25:51their faces and they were really angry i mean it was very obvious to me if these people could they'd cut
00:25:58our throats farmers resented being forced to abandon their homes and move to strategic hamlets corrupt officials
00:26:12siphoned off funds and villagers blamed the ziem regime for failing to protect them from guerrilla
00:26:19attacks as the people's anger grew so did the ranks of the vietcong
00:26:26it turned out that the vietcong were recruiting men right out of those strategic so-called strategic
00:26:33hamlets and then the whole program fell apart the chính quyền miền nam
00:26:39đấy cũng đã nói tức là gọi là tắt nước để bắt cá tức là họ cho rằng là quân cách mạng quân giải phóng
00:26:48là như là cá mà chân ở trong nước thì tắt nước đi tắt nước đi tắt nước đi để mà bắt cá không thể thành công
00:27:00Nguyễn Nắp's father was a postal clerk south of Da Nang his brothers and sisters taught in south
00:27:06vietnamese schools but he joined the revolution and as a political officer wrote poems songs and slogans
00:27:15to inspire the people in the countryside to support the vietcong
00:27:22the vietcong cadre would come in and talk to them and their message is usually
00:27:30which means turn your grief into action do something about it join us
00:27:38we'll fight together we'll liberate the country from this corrupt unjust government
00:27:44we'll throw out the foreigners we'll reunify the country and we'll bring in this great regime
00:27:51that will take care of you and bring economic and social justice
00:27:56the vietcong ran rival local governments complete with their own tax collectors and school teachers
00:28:04spies and propagandists and province chiefs
00:28:07to make matters worse arvin troops and american advisers now found themselves confronted by a new threat
00:28:19battalions of well-armed vietcong soldiers as well as by local guerrillas
00:28:27we'd armed them you could hear the arming of the vietcong back in early 62 they only had one machine gun per
00:28:35battalion it was sporadic fire then as they captured more and more of these american arms when you made
00:28:43contact it finally it would build up into a drum fire of automatic and semi-automatic weapons
00:28:55secretary mcnamara decided that he would draw up some kind of a chart to determine whether we were winning
00:29:02or not and he was putting things in like numbers of weapons recovered numbers of yet kong killed
00:29:12very statistical
00:29:17and he asked edward lansdale who was then in the pentagon as head of special operations to come down
00:29:23and look at this and so lansdale did and he said there's something missing
00:29:29and mcnamara said what and lansdale said the feelings of the vietnamese people
00:29:36you couldn't reduce it to a statistic
00:29:41robert mcnamara had vowed to make america's military cost effective he demanded that everything be
00:29:48quantified in saigon general paul d harkins head of the military assistance command vietnam known as
00:29:58mac v dutifully complied he and his staff generated mountains of daily weekly monthly and quarterly
00:30:07data on more than a hundred separate indicators far more data than could ever be adequately analyzed
00:30:18general harkins had little use for skeptical reporters like neil sheehan
00:30:23bad news was to be buried harkins ignored the alarming after action reports john paul van and other
00:30:32officers were sending in from the field i was going to be made head of the vietnam desk at cia headquarters
00:30:41and the first person of importance that i met was general parkins and he started out by saying
00:30:49mr greg i don't care what you hear from anybody else i can tell you without a doubt we're going
00:30:53to be out of here with a military victory in six months the country's 12 million peasants can scarcely
00:31:00remember what peace was like they're caught between the predatory guerrillas and the almost equally
00:31:05demanding soldiery their lives are lived in a state of permanent uncertainty punctuated by bouts of
00:31:11violence as government forces come to grips with the black clad communist rebel forces called the viet kong
00:31:22cả cái miền nam là một chiến trường
00:31:28mà nếu như người mỹ đòi hỏi có thể xây dựng dân chủ ngay trên cái đống đổ nát ấy
00:31:34thì tôi nghĩ đấy là một cái đòi hỏi quá đáng thì rõ ràng là miền nam dân chủ thì tốt hơn nhưng mà
00:31:44trong với cuộc đỏ sức bằng súng đạn giữa hai bên người khi người cầm súng mà ít băn khoăn hơn ít đặt nhiều
00:31:54hơn thì bên đó sẽ chiến thắng ờ ừ ừ ừ ờ ừ ờ ờ ồ ồ ồ ồ ồ ồ
00:32:04Hồ Chí Minh HD là một cái người hoạt động trong nhân dân trong khuồn chung rất giỏi
00:32:11à mà ông biết là Việt Nam là người Việt Nam thì có các truyền thống người ta eleva para nó trọng là
00:32:17He was used to be a young man.
00:32:19So he had to play a young man.
00:32:21He had a long time, so he was not a small man.
00:32:25He was a young man.
00:32:27He lived with everyone.
00:32:29He was trying to make a life with all enough strength.
00:32:33But he was speaking with the word very hard to understand everyone.
00:32:39He was a very difficult person to do that.
00:32:47On our side,
00:33:17we were not as committed and we were, our leaders were corrupt and incompetent.
00:33:25And so deep down, we always have this fear, this suspicion that in the end, it would be the communists who won.
00:33:37When John Kennedy assembled what he thinks is the best and the brightest,
00:33:4120 years before that, in a cave in the northern part of Vietnam,
00:33:48Ho Chi Minh also put together his best and the brightest.
00:33:52And these guys are at it for a while.
00:33:53And when we show up, they were far along to consolidating their victory
00:34:01over this inevitable conflict between Ho Chi Minh and John F. Kennedy's vision.
00:34:08The more you think about the American strategy,
00:34:14the more you know that it was never going to work out particularly well.
00:34:20I was at the top of my game when I was in combat.
00:34:41You don't have the luxury to indulge your fear
00:34:49because other people's lives depend upon you keeping your head cold.
00:34:53You know, when something goes wrong,
00:35:05they call it emotional numbing.
00:35:06It's not very good in civilian life, but it's pretty useful in combat.
00:35:11To be able to get absolutely very cold about what needs to be done
00:35:27and to stick with it.
00:35:36To me, it's a little bit distressing to realize that I was at my best
00:35:40doing something as terrible as war.
00:35:53President Kennedy has staked his reputation in Asia
00:35:55on saving South Vietnam from communism.
00:35:59As the army makes a sweep towards a village suspected of harboring Viet Cong,
00:36:03it can't tell whether it'll meet resistance.
00:36:10To be able to get to the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village of the village
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00:40:42Back home, Americans were paying little attention to what was happening in Vietnam.
00:40:48They were watching the Beverly Hillbillies and Gunsmoke on TV.
00:40:52They were interested in whether the Yankees would win the World Series again and in the recent
00:40:59death of Marilyn Monroe.
00:41:00But some Americans had been growing impatient with the slow pace of social change.
00:41:09We were told in the 50s that we lived in the middle of trying to figure out what it meant to be a citizen of this best country in the world, suddenly the civil rights movement exploded into our consciousness.
00:41:27We didn't think we had any power.
00:41:35We didn't think we could be actors in history, that we could affect things.
00:41:41And suddenly, you know, these young black students in the South were doing exactly that, and it just blew the tops of our heads off.
00:41:57So darling, darling, stand by me, oh, stand by me, oh, stand by me, oh, stand, stand by me, stand by me, with the sky.
00:42:17Rosalyn County Donate
00:42:18Other Americans were concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world.
00:42:26Perhaps it would be a good thing to put Khrushchev and Kennedy on an island and not let either of them off until they came to an agreement.
00:42:38And all, and all extent by me, you, for the sky.
00:42:47And if you were in a cafe when Diem was giving a speech, somebody would get up and shut the
00:43:03radio off. He'd be coming in over the radio. Somebody would get up and they'd just shut
00:43:06the radio off. I mean, he was not connected to his own population.
00:43:11Diem was simply the opposite of what democracy was. South Vietnam in the competition against
00:43:22the North, that should have been a golden opportunity to have that society open with the free press
00:43:34of free expression. But there was not much choice if the two system might structurally
00:43:43dictator and oppressive systems, one under the Communist Party, one under a family.
00:43:50I see him. I know him. He didn't lead the government. The one who have the control over the government
00:44:03is a brother, Brother Nhu. Diem's brother, Ngo Deng Nhu, had been the architect of the strategic
00:44:13public program, ran a personal political party that mirrored the techniques and the ruthlessness
00:44:20of the communists, and supervised a host of internal security units that spied on and seized
00:44:27enemies of the regime. Some reporters who probed too deeply into what Diem and Nhu were doing
00:44:36were ordered out of the country. When an American journalist objected, Nhu's sharp-tongued wife told
00:44:43him Vietnam had no use for your crazy freedoms.
00:44:48Meanwhile, out in the countryside, John Paul Vann and other advisers had begun to notice that the
00:44:56corruption within Diem's regime had filtered down to the commanders in the field. Troops who had once been
00:45:04willing to engage the enemy, now seemed strangely reluctant.
00:45:11God, I was told so many times, Diewe, you know, Scanlan, Diewe, very dangerous, you know, going out there.
00:45:24John Vann would go out with him at night, and he noticed that somebody would always cough
00:45:31or make some other slight noise when it turned out that the Viet Cong were heading into the ambush site.
00:45:38They did not want to get in a fight.
00:45:40South Vietnamese officers were chosen less for their combat skill than for their loyalty to President Diem.
00:45:48And their men knew it.
00:45:50What we should have done is either forced the Vietnamese, I mean, really, forced them to clean up their act.
00:45:59And if they wouldn't clean up their act, they'd say, we're out of here.
00:46:03Because we don't bet on losing horses. This is a losing horse. You are not going to win this insurgency.
00:46:12We as Americans should have understood the desire of the Vietnamese people to have their own country.
00:46:18I mean, we did the same thing to the Brits.
00:46:22In October of 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union came closer than they would ever come again to mutually assured destruction.
00:46:39Good evening, my fellow citizens.
00:46:41This government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba.
00:46:52Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island.
00:47:05The Soviets had secretly placed nuclear missiles 90 miles from the United States.
00:47:13The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged President Kennedy to bomb Cuba.
00:47:18He resisted and instead ordered a naval blockade to stop Soviet ships from resupplying the island.
00:47:28For 13 excruciating days, the world held its breath.
00:47:35Finally, in exchange for a private pledge to remove American missiles from Turkey,
00:47:43Khrushchev agreed to remove his missiles from Cuba.
00:47:49Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wanted so direct a confrontation ever again.
00:47:55From now on, limited wars, like the growing conflict in Vietnam, would assume still greater importance.
00:48:05I'd grown up in the shadow of the mushroom cloud.
00:48:12And I remember watching President Kennedy speak during the Cuban Missile Crisis and wondering if I was ever going to kiss a girl.
00:48:20And so this was just continuing that battle against the Russians, only we were fighting, you know, their proxies, the Vietnamese there.
00:48:31But it was monolithic communism.
00:48:33It didn't matter to me where it was, I was going to go if my government said we needed to be there.
00:48:40We were probably the last kids of any generation that actually believed our government would never lie to us.
00:48:47We had been writing stories about all the flaws on the Saigon side, about how they wouldn't fight, the corruption, they wouldn't obey orders, the disorganization.
00:49:02And then all of a sudden, the Viet Cong for the first time, the raggedy ass little bastards, as the Harkinsons people in Saigon called them, stood and fought.
00:49:15And suddenly all the flaws on the Saigon side were illuminated by this.
00:49:20Like a star shell, it illuminated the battlefield. Everything came out.
00:49:25A few days after Christmas, 1962, the 7th Arvind Division got orders to capture a Viet Cong radio transmitter, broadcasting from a spot some 40 miles southwest of Saigon in a village called Tuntoy.
00:49:43The village was surrounded by rice paddies. An irrigation dike linked it to a neighboring hamlet at back.
00:49:51Intelligence suggested no more than 120 guerrillas were guarding the transmitter.
00:49:59John Paul Vann helped draw up what seemed to be a foolproof plan of attack.
00:50:05Supported by helicopters and armored personnel carriers, some 1,200 South Vietnamese troops would attack the village from three sides.
00:50:14When the surviving Viet Cong tried to flee through the gap left open for them, as they always had whenever outnumbered and confronted by modern weapons, artillery and airstrikes would destroy them.
00:50:28Vann would observe the fighting from a spotter plane.
00:50:31But the intelligence underlying it all turned out to be wrong.
00:50:38There were more than 340 Viet Cong, not 120 in the area.
00:50:45Communist spies had tipped them off that they were soon to be attacked.
00:50:50And this time, they would not flee without a fight.
00:50:53Among them was Le Kwon Kom, who had been a guerrilla fighter since 1951, when he was 12.
00:51:02In 2012.
00:51:16At 6.35 in the morning, on January 2nd, 1963, 10 American helicopters ferried an Arvin company to a spot just north of Tan Toi.
00:51:27They met no resistance.
00:51:35Meanwhile, two South Vietnamese Civil Guard battalions approached Ap Back from the south on foot.
00:51:44The Viet Cong commander let the Civil Guards get within 100 feet before giving the order to fire.
00:51:53Several South Vietnamese soldiers were killed.
00:51:57survivors hid behind a dike.
00:52:02Ten more helicopters, filled with troops and escorted by five helicopter gunships, roared in to help.
00:52:13The Viet Cong machine guns hit 14 of the U.S.
00:52:16to help.
00:52:17The Viet Cong machine guns hit 14 of the U.S.
00:52:18to help.
00:52:19The Viet Cong machine guns hit 14 of the U.S.
00:52:2015 aircraft.
00:52:21Five would be destroyed, killing and wounding American crewmen.
00:52:23The Viet Cong machine guns.
00:52:24The Viet Cong machine guns hit 14 of the U.S.
00:52:26The Viet Cong machine guns hit 14 of the U.S.
00:52:4315 aircraft.
00:52:44Five would be destroyed, killing and wounding American crewmen.
00:52:50The enemy concentrated their fire on the Arvin struggling to get out of the downed helicopters.
00:53:05It was like shooting ducks for the Viet Cong, an American crewman remembered.
00:53:12Colonel Vann circled helplessly overhead.
00:53:15He radioed the Arvin commander, urging him to send an APC unit to rescue the men.
00:53:23I got the word from John Vann that American helicopters were down.
00:53:29They were right in front of the Viet Cong positions.
00:53:32We had Americans killed and wounded, and we had to get over there right away.
00:53:37Like Vann, Captain Scanlon was only an advisor.
00:53:41Captain Lee Taumbah, his Arvin counterpart, would have to give the order to advance.
00:53:48Scanlon liked and admired him.
00:53:51I turned to Vann and said, hey, you know, you've got to get over there right away.
00:53:57And Vann said to me, I'm not going.
00:54:00Vann's superiors within the Arvin, far from the battlefield, had told him to stay put.
00:54:06John Vann, my boss, was screaming at me over the radio to get them over there.
00:54:15It took Scanlon an hour to convince Captain Ba to move.
00:54:20Another two hours were lost before the APCs could make their way through the paddies toward the trapped men.
00:54:26The firing had died down.
00:54:31Everything was quiet.
00:54:33You could see the open expanse of rice fields.
00:54:36And my reaction was, hey, it was all over.
00:54:40The first two APCs dropped their ramps.
00:54:43Infantry squad stepped out, prepared to spray the tree line with automatic fire as they advance.
00:54:49In the past, that had been enough to make the Viet Cong scurry away.
00:54:55This time was different.
00:54:58Eight of the APCs came under attack.
00:55:04Within minutes, six of their gunners had been killed, shot through the head.
00:55:08And, boy, we got raked.
00:55:12So it was like a pool table.
00:55:14We were on the green and they were in the pocket.
00:55:17Sheep matters.
00:55:19When Captain Ba managed to convince a few more APCs to advance,
00:55:24guerrillas leapt from their foxholes and hurled hand grenades at them.
00:55:28None did any real damage, but the drivers were so demoralized that they halted, turned around and withdrew behind the wrecked helicopters.
00:55:44From his spotter plane, Van begged the Arvin to make a simultaneous assault on the enemy by all the remaining ground forces.
00:55:54Arvin commanders refused.
00:56:01That night, the Viet Cong melted away, carrying most of their dead and wounded with them.
00:56:09At least 80 South Vietnamese soldiers had been killed.
00:56:14So had three American advisors, including Captain Ken Good, a friend of Scanlon's.
00:56:24We stacked the armored personnel carriers with bodies.
00:56:28Stacked them up on top until we couldn't stack anymore.
00:56:32And I wouldn't let the Vietnamese touch Americans.
00:56:37So I carried Americans out.
00:56:41And I was exhausted.
00:56:45They, uh, told me about, uh, Ken Good getting killed.
00:56:51And Ken and I had worked so hard with our two battalions and, uh, to hear that, uh, he got killed hurt.
00:57:02Great guy.
00:57:03Reporters arrived from Saigon before all of the Arvin dead could be removed.
00:57:10They were horrified at what they saw and tried to find out what had really happened.
00:57:17John Paul Vann took Neil Sheehan and David Halberstam aside and told them.
00:57:25The Battle of Apbac had been a miserable goddamn performance.
00:57:30The Arvin won't listen, he said.
00:57:32They make the same mistakes over and over again in the same way.
00:57:36But back in Saigon, General Harkins immediately declared victory.
00:57:44The Arvin forces had an objective, he said.
00:57:47We took that objective.
00:57:49The VC left and their casualties were greater than those of the government forces.
00:57:55What more do you want?
00:57:56When Halberstam and Sheehan reported that Apbac had, in fact, been a defeat, the U.S. commander in the Pacific denied it all and urged the reporters to get on the team.
00:58:13Apbac was terribly important.
00:58:16They'd shot down five helicopters, which they'd previously been terrified of.
00:58:21They'd stopped the armored personnel carriers.
00:58:23They demonstrated to their own people that you could resist the Americans and win.
00:58:29At that time, the battle of Apbac was very difficult.
00:58:30At that time, the battle of Apbac was very difficult.
00:58:31At that time, the battle of Apbac was very difficult.
00:58:32In Hanoi, the Battle of Apbac was seen by Party First Secretary Lei Zouan and his Politburo allies as evidence of the enemy.
00:58:34In Hanoi, the Battle of Apbac was seen by Party First Secretary Lei Zouan and his Politburo allies as evidence of the inherent weakness of the South Vietnamese regime.
00:58:49Even when faced with American advisors and weaponry, the Viet Cong had learned how to inflict heavy casualties on Saigon's forces and get away again.
00:59:10In Saigon, President Xi'an claimed the Arvin were winning, not losing.
00:59:21Apbac had only been a momentary setback, and he resented Americans telling him how to fight his battles or run his country.
00:59:30The President's sister-in-law, Madame Nhu, went further.
00:59:35She denounced the Americans as false brothers.
00:59:39We don't have a prayer of staying in Vietnam, President Kennedy privately told a friend that spring.
00:59:48These people hate us.
00:59:50But I can't give up a piece of territory like that to the Communists and then get the people to re-elect me.
00:59:58Buddhist monks and nuns are joined by thousands of sympathizers to protest the government's restrictions on the practice of their religion in South Vietnam.
01:00:14Xi'an began by alienating the rural population, and that started the Viet Cong.
01:00:21Now he was alienating the urban population.
01:00:24Seventy percent of the population is Buddhist, and the demonstrators clashed with the police during the week-long series of incidents like this.
01:00:33In the months that followed the Battle of Apbac, South Vietnam plunged into civil strife that had little to do with the Viet Cong.
01:00:43Religion and nationalism were at its heart.
01:00:47A Catholic minority had for years dominated the government of an overwhelmingly Buddhist country.
01:00:54That spring, in the city of Wei, Christian flags had been flown to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the ordination of Diem's older brother as a Catholic bishop.
01:01:09But when the Buddhists of the city flew their flags to celebrate the 2527th birthday of Lord Buddha, police tore them down.
01:01:23Protesters took to the streets.
01:01:28The Catholic deputy province chief sent security forces to suppress the demonstration.
01:01:34The soldiers opened fire.
01:01:37Eight protesters died.
01:01:40The youngest was 12.
01:01:42The oldest was 20.
01:01:46The Diem regime blamed the Viet Cong.
01:01:51Monks throughout the country demanded an apology.
01:02:03They also called for an end to discrimination by Catholic officials.
01:02:08Many Buddhists had come to see Diem's policies as a direct threat to their religious beliefs.
01:02:15My family was against what Diem was doing.
01:02:21My mother was convinced that Diem was destroying the Buddhist faith.
01:02:27She would go to the pagodas and listen to the monks' speeches and she was just extremely upset.
01:02:36She was not alone.
01:02:38There was a lot of people like her.
01:02:40American officials urged Diem and his brother Niu to make meaningful concessions to the Buddhists for the sake of maintaining unity in the struggle against communism.
01:02:54They refused.
01:02:58On June 10th, 1963, Malcolm Brown of the Associated Press received an anonymous tip.
01:03:05Something important was going to happen the next day at a major intersection in Saigon.
01:03:12He took his camera.
01:03:14To protest the Diem regime's repression, a 73-year-old monk named Quang Duc set himself on fire.
01:03:32As a large, hushed crowd watched him burn to death, another monk repeated over and over again in English and Vietnamese,
01:04:01a Buddhist monk became a martyr.
01:04:02A Buddhist monk becomes a martyr.
01:04:04A Buddhist monk becomes a martyr.
01:04:05A Buddhist monk becomes a martyr.
01:04:06A Buddhist monk becomes a martyr.
01:04:08I remember they held the ashes of a monk who burned himself to death, or was kept in one of the main pagodas.
01:04:22And lines of people came to pass by, and I saw these women, not rich women, ordinary Vietnamese women, take off the one piece of gold they had on their wedding ring and drop it in the bottle to contribute to the struggle.
01:04:39And I thought to myself, this regime is over, it's the end.
01:04:49Soon, other monks would become martyrs.
01:04:56Fresh outbursts by Madame Niu only made things worse.
01:05:01Burning monks made her clap her hands, she said.
01:05:04If more monks wanted to burn themselves, she would provide the matches.
01:05:09The only thing they have done, they have barbecued one of their monks, whom they have intoxicated, whom they have abused the confidence.
01:05:23And even that barbecuing was done, not even with self-sufficient means, because they used imported gasoline.
01:05:35They thought she was arrogant, she was power hungry.
01:05:39They suspected her and her husband of being corrupt.
01:05:42Niu ran the secret police, which arrested and tortured people.
01:05:48People feared the Siem regime, perhaps more than they feared it, they really hated it.
01:05:57Students, including many Catholics, rallied to the Buddhist cause.
01:06:03So did some army officers.
01:06:07People among the military had to ask the question, can we continue this kind of situation like that,
01:06:14when the whole country was almost burning with the kind of protest from the Buddhists, you see?
01:06:24I first became aware of Vietnam because of a burning monk.
01:06:31We had watched the civil rights movement in the south, and it had set the standard for us to stand up against injustice.
01:06:43Allow yourself to be beaten up, allow yourself to be attacked by a dog or hit by a police truncheon.
01:06:50And we had enormous respect for people who were willing to go that far.
01:07:00And then one day in 1963, we saw on television a picture of a monk in Saigon.
01:07:08This was an extraordinary act.
01:07:13Why was a Buddhist monk burning himself on the streets of Saigon?
01:07:22The protests continued.
01:07:24Tensions between Washington and Saigon steadily worsened.
01:07:29The more the Kennedy administration demanded change, the more Ziem and his brother New seemed to resist.
01:07:38The White House announced that a new American ambassador, former Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, was being sent to Saigon.
01:07:46A man eminent enough, the president hoped, to make Ziem listen more closely to American advice.
01:07:54Ziem professed to be unimpressed.
01:07:57They can send ten lodges, he said, but I will not let myself or my country be humiliated, not if they train their artillery on this palace.
01:08:08He did promise the outgoing ambassador, Frederick Nolting, that he would take no further repressive steps against the Buddhists.
01:08:19Then, a few minutes after midnight on August 21, 1963, with Nolting gone and Henry Cabot Lodge's arrival still one day away,
01:08:30Ziem cut the phone lines of all the senior American officials in Saigon.
01:08:37And sent hundreds of his special forces storming into Buddhist pagodas in Saigon, Hue, and several other South Vietnamese cities.
01:08:46Some 1400 monks and nuns, students and ordinary citizens, were rounded up and taken away.
01:08:55Stop the Buddhists!
01:09:03Martial law was imposed.
01:09:05Public meetings were forbidden.
01:09:08Troops were authorized to shoot anyone found on the streets after nine o'clock.
01:09:13Tanks guard a pagoda in Saigon during South Vietnam's bafflingly complicated crisis that has the government of precedent known in Ziem,
01:09:23students and Buddhists, and the United States government, all trying to guess one another's next movement.
01:09:31When college students protested in support of the monks, Ziem closed Vietnam's universities.
01:09:37High school students then poured into the streets.
01:09:42He shut down all the high schools and the grammar schools too, and arrested thousands of school children,
01:09:49including the sons and daughters of officials in his own government.
01:09:53I participated in the demonstrations.
01:09:56I strongly believe that the government has to be overturned, because it's a dictator government.
01:10:06We couldn't stand it anymore, and this is an opportunity to rise against it.
01:10:12Fan Kuang Tui was a law student that summer.
01:10:16His father was a prominent nationalist whom Ziem had jailed for calling for greater democracy.
01:10:24I was and I'm still a Catholic, not a very good Catholic.
01:10:29I don't practice religiously, but I'm a Catholic.
01:10:33I was rightly arrested because I did participate in the demonstration.
01:10:39And I was interrogated and briefly tortured and beaten a little bit.
01:10:49Henry Cavett Lodge took over as U.S. ambassador in the midst of the turmoil,
01:10:53and he is reported to have demanded that President Ziem's brother Nu be austered,
01:10:57or U.S. aid to Vietnam will be cut.
01:11:03In the wake of the Pagoda raids, a small group of South Vietnamese generals contacted the CIA in Saigon.
01:11:11Ziem's brother Nu was now largely in control of the government, they said.
01:11:17What would Washington's reaction be if they mounted a coup?
01:11:22President Kennedy and his senior advisors happened to be out of town.
01:11:27So Roger Hilsman Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,
01:11:34and a critic of the Ziem regime, took it upon himself to draft a cable with new instructions for Ambassador Lodge.
01:11:42The U.S. government could no longer tolerate a situation in which power lay in Nu's hands, it said.
01:11:51Ziem should be given a chance to rid himself of his brother.
01:11:54If he refused, Lodge was to tell the generals, then we must face the possibility that Ziem himself cannot be preserved.
01:12:05The President was vacationing at Hyannisport, Massachusetts.
01:12:09Under Secretary of State George Ball read part of the cable to him over the phone.
01:12:16Since the early 1950s, the United States government had encouraged and even orchestrated other Cold War coups in Iran, Guatemala, the Congo, and elsewhere.
01:12:29Kennedy decided to approve Hilsman's cable, in part because he thought his top advisers had already endorsed it.
01:12:42They had not.
01:12:43And somehow, because of a cable that came out from Washington, Lodge decided that the only solution was to get rid of not just Snowden knew the bad brother, but also of Ziem himself.
01:13:00And that started us on this whole business of promoting a coup.
01:13:03And it was not a good idea.
01:13:08I just had a feeling of impending disaster.
01:13:12On September 2nd, 1963, Labor Day, Walter Cronkite of CBS News interviewed President Kennedy.
01:13:20The President used the opportunity to deliver a message to President Ziem.
01:13:27Sir President, the only hot war we've got running at the moment is, of course, the one in Vietnam.
01:13:33And we've got our difficulties there, quite obviously.
01:13:37I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the government to win popular support that the war can be won out there.
01:13:45In the final analysis, it's their war.
01:13:46Well, hasn't every indication from Saigon been that President Ziem has no intention of changing his pattern?
01:13:54If he doesn't change it, of course, that's his decision.
01:13:57He's been there 10 years.
01:13:58And as I say, he has carried this burden when he's been counted out on a number of occasions.
01:14:02Our best judgment is that he can't be successful on this basis.
01:14:05But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw.
01:14:08That'd be a great mistake. That'd be a great mistake.
01:14:10I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort.
01:14:1347 Americans have been killed.
01:14:16We're in a very desperate struggle against the Communist system.
01:14:20And I don't want Asia to pass into the control of the Chinese.
01:14:24Do you think that this government still has time to regain the support of the people?
01:14:30With changes in policy and perhaps in personnel, I think it can.
01:14:35If it doesn't make those changes, I would think the chances of winning it would not be very good.
01:14:45Despite the cable, Kennedy and his advisers were sharply divided about a coup.
01:14:50Robert McNamara, Maxwell Taylor, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, and the head of the CIA all cautioned against it.
01:15:01Because while none of them especially admired Xi'an, they did not believe there was any viable alternative.
01:15:07Fritz Nolting was called in and he said, as difficult as they are to deal with, there is nobody with the guts and sang froid in Vietnam of Xi'an and his brother knew.
01:15:22And if we let them go, we will be saddled by a descending cycle of mediocre generals.
01:15:28And he was absolutely correct.
01:15:32But several State Department officials believed that without fresh leadership, South Vietnam could not survive.
01:15:41The debate intensified.
01:15:44My God, the president said, my administration is coming apart.
01:15:50In the end, Kennedy instructed Lodge to tell the renegade generals
01:15:55that while the United States does not wish to stimulate a coup, it would not thwart one either.
01:16:03The generals laid their plans.
01:16:13On November 1st, 1963, troops loyal to the plotters seized key installations in Saigon
01:16:21and demanded Xiem and Yu surrender.
01:16:27The battle for the city went on for 18 hours,
01:16:30and most of it was centered on the presidential palace.
01:16:33Just after 6.30 in the morning Saturday, the shooting ceased.
01:16:36The shooting ceased.
01:16:45Xiem and Yu escaped, took sanctuary in a church, and agreed to surrender to the rebels in exchange for the promise of safe passage out of the country.
01:16:56They were picked up in an armored personnel carrier.
01:17:01And murdered soon after they climbed inside.
01:17:06Madame Yu survived the coup.
01:17:11She was on a goodwill tour in the United States.
01:17:14The system was overturned on November 1st.
01:17:28I was released November 4th.
01:17:30And it was the most exciting moment in the life of Saigon.
01:17:36The excitement, you could feel it in the air.
01:17:40I was thinking that, yeah, it's a good thing.
01:17:44Xiem was making it impossible to win the war because people were so against him that the war would be lost if he stayed in power.
01:18:00My father was a bit worried because he didn't know who was going to replace Xiem.
01:18:05Ambassador Lodge reported to Washington that every Vietnamese has a smile on his face today.
01:18:15The prospects are now for a shorter war, he said, provided the generals stay together.
01:18:22Certainly officers and soldiers who can pull off an operation like this, he continued, should be able to do very well on the battlefield if their hearts are in it.
01:18:32President Kennedy was not so sure.
01:18:39He was appalled that Xiem and Yu had been killed.
01:18:43Three days later, he dictated his own rueful account of the coup and his concerns for the future.
01:18:50Monday, November 4th, 1963, over the weekend the coup in Saigon took place, culminated three months of conversation which divided the government here and in Saigon.
01:19:07I feel that we must bear a good deal of responsibility for it, beginning with our cable of August in which we suggested the coup.
01:19:19I should not have given my consent to it without a round table conference.
01:19:24I was shocked by the death of Xiem and Yu. The way he was killed made it particularly abhorrent.
01:19:36The question now is whether the generals can stay together and build a stable government or whether public opinion in Saigon will turn on this government as repressive and undemocratic in the not-too-distant future.
01:19:47Kennedy would not live to see the answer to the question he had asked.
01:19:59He was murdered in Dallas 18 days later.
01:20:02There were now 16,000 American advisors in South Vietnam.
01:20:09Their fate and the fate of that embattled country rested with another American president, Lyndon Baines Johnson.
01:20:32We thought we were the exceptions to history, we Americans. History didn't apply to us.
01:20:43We could never fight a bad war. We could never represent the wrong cause. We were Americans.
01:20:49While in Vietnam it proved that we were not an exception to history.
01:20:53This is a mean old world to live in all by yourself.
01:21:19This is a mean old world to live in all by yourself.
01:21:22This is a mean old world to live in all by yourself.
01:21:39This is a mean old world to live in all by yourself.
01:21:48This is a mean old world to try and live in all by yourself.
01:22:04New Southam inconvenience in South Africa
01:22:05This is a mean old world to live in all by yourself.
01:22:15Last year, Jahreel다는 has been to the end of Thailand 18 days later.
01:22:19If I had someone who loved me too
01:22:28If I had someone who loved me too
01:22:36Then I know I wouldn't be so blue
01:22:43This is a mean old world to try and live in
01:22:49All by yourself
01:22:53Oh, I found myself dreaming
01:23:01I found the love
01:23:06Sometimes I find myself dreaming
01:23:16I found the love
01:23:20Sometimes I dream I've really
01:23:25Find the love
01:23:30Someone who loved me too
01:23:34Have the stars above
01:23:36Oh, this is a mean old world
01:23:39To try and live in
01:23:41All by yourself
01:24:00Or else birds
01:24:03I sleep
01:24:03I'm going on
01:24:06I Reveal
01:24:08How many things bear
01:24:09Tells it
01:24:11That is my friend
01:24:13I was saying
01:24:14Some people
01:24:14I dab
01:24:15I go
01:24:19I see
01:24:22I'm going
01:24:23I know
01:24:24I'm going
01:24:25I am
01:24:26I'm going
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