Thom Tillis Grills FDIC Chairperson Nominee: What ‘Is The Root Cause' Of The SVB Failure?

  • 3 months ago
Earlier this month, Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC) questioned FDIC Chairperson Nominee Christy Goldsmith Romero on bank failures during a Senate Banking Committee hearing.

Fuel your success with Forbes. Gain unlimited access to premium journalism, including breaking news, groundbreaking in-depth reported stories, daily digests and more. Plus, members get a front-row seat at members-only events with leading thinkers and doers, access to premium video that can help you get ahead, an ad-light experience, early access to select products including NFT drops and more:

https://account.forbes.com/membership/?utm_source=youtube&utm_medium=display&utm_campaign=growth_non-sub_paid_subscribe_ytdescript


Stay Connected
Forbes on Facebook: http://fb.com/forbes
Forbes Video on Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/forbes
Forbes Video on Instagram: http://instagram.com/forbes
More From Forbes: http://forbes.com

Category

🗞
News
Transcript
00:00of North Carolina is recognized. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Congratulations to all of
00:05you for your nominations. Commissioner Crenshaw, I want to start with you. You
00:11made a statement after the SEC's recent climate rule, and I think to use your
00:17words, you said you considered the rule to be the bare minimum and not the rule
00:23I would have written. So I'm curious, with respect to scope 3 reporting
00:29requirements, is that one of the root causes of your disappointment? If you can
00:33keep your comments brief, I would appreciate it. Sure, Senator. Thank you.
00:36With respect to bare minimum, my intent there was... Where did it fall short? It fell
00:43short, well, investors. I talked about two places where investors... what I was
00:48really thinking about when I said not the rule I would have written was I
00:52would have thought about using models, assumptions, and estimates much more
00:56completely than we did, and that way we could have gotten more information to
01:00investors in a way that was less expensive, and I would also have considered
01:04robust safe harbors from liability. If confirmed, would you consider
01:11reopening the rule? And if you did, would scope 3 reporting requirements be a
01:16part of the revised rule? I don't know, Senator. As you know, it's in litigation
01:22right now, so a lot is going to depend on the outcome of the litigation, and I don't
01:25know. Do you generally support the notion of scope 3 reporting requirements? I think
01:29investors had put comments in the comment file, and I think we need to
01:33balance the interests, but I think there's a way that you can look at
01:37assumptions and estimates and a safe harbor from liability to ensure that the
01:41costs are not prohibitive, and to ensure that you're not asking farmers and
01:45unregistered entities to provide information. Okay, thank you.
01:48Ms. Goldsmith-Romero, I want to go back to Silicon Valley Bank. What, in your
01:55opinion, if you could only, the major root cause of SVB's failure, what
01:59cause of SVB's failure, what was it? Was it, well, actually, let me not give you
02:06choices. What do you think the root cause of SVB Bank was? Thank you, Senator, for
02:13that failure of risk management at the bank, and then failures on the
02:17regulatory supervision. Yeah, so you didn't see capitalization as an issue? I
02:23was not, you know, a bank regular at that time, but it seemed like the root
02:27cause is what you were just asking. Poorly managed and poorly supervised?
02:31Correct. And I think as a result, because at the time of the, it seems like it
02:42was ages ago, it's hard to believe it hasn't been that long, but at the time of
02:48the failure, everybody was saying, and because they felt so many other banks
02:52were failing, was it your opinion that what we saw there was going to ripple
02:55through? I know we had the one other failure, First Republic, but do you
03:01view those, as some of us do, as kind of outliers in the banking industry based
03:06on their models and activities? So this is a really interesting question, so let me
03:11take it back even a little bit farther, which is the crisis, and this really
03:15comes down to consumer confidence, right? If consumers don't have confidence that
03:19their money is safe, you know, businesses and individuals, then you're going to see
03:23bank runs, and you're going to see contagion. You may have bank runs not
03:27even related to the banks who are in trouble, and what we don't want to have
03:31that. We don't want to have people pulling their money out of the bank and
03:33putting it in just one of the hugest banks, thinking that it's safe, and so, you
03:38know, I think there was a situation where there was Silicon Valley Bank and
03:41Signature, and they tried to, the regulators tried to contain that, but I
03:46do think we need to, we need to really be looking deeply at this issue of bank
03:50runs and consumer confidence, particularly in modern, modernized
03:54banking. I just felt like there was some thinking, you know, a lot of people were
03:58attributing the Senate Bill 2155, I was one of four on my side that, that worked
04:03with Senator Warner and others on that bill. They were trying to blame it on
04:08just a lack of regulation, but it doesn't really, it seemed like a lack of
04:13supervision, and a lack of risk management, so I'll move on from there.
04:19Kind of curious about your view of the 2024 stress test. I read the results of
04:25those stress tests to say that our banks are pretty well capitalized. How do you
04:28read the results of those stress tests? Yeah, so again, I'm on the outside looking
04:34at it just like you are, and so it does seem like some capital is strong. I think
04:40there are some areas that need to be looked at, but that's how I read this.
04:43But is a stress test by definition really subjecting the banks to some of
04:48those areas? Do you think that the stress tests themselves are
04:52insufficient, or you just need to look at the details within the stress test scenarios?
04:56Yeah, I mean, I'm very familiar with stress tests. I mean, it's designed for
04:59capital adequacy, and so... And it's literally stressing, so it's
05:03coming up with extraordinary circumstances, so... Absolutely, sir, yes. Okay, thank you.
05:08Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Recommended